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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
legislature to change methods of procedure, as the Declaratory Judg-
ment Acts generally do, and to create new forms of action and remove
restrictions against invoking court action, has long been admitted. Law
is a progressive science, and certain forms of procedure once thought
essential are now disregarded because of altered conditions. Conditions
are so altered now as to require and justify declaratory judgments.
Wilton John Sherman.
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AcTroN-JSRisnrcnow AS TO REmEDY-ARBrrRATION AGREEMMNT.-The plain-
tiff was engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures to theaters. By
a contract with the defendant, the plaintiff was to furnish ten motion pictures
to the defendant to be shown in the latter's theater. The plaintiff delivered
five of these pictures and was ready and willing to deliver the rest but the
defendant refused'to accept them. There was an arbitration agreement between
the parties in the original contract whereby they agreed that before either
should resort to any court for the determination or the protection of his rights,
all claims and controversies arising under the contract should be submitted to
the board of arbitrators. A board of arbitrators was selected as per agreement
and decided that the defendant must pay for the pictures Ve had ordered
and refused to accept. Before the award, however, the defendant had stated
he would not abide by it. The defendant refused to comply with the award
after it was made. This is a suit upon that award arising in the common pleas
court of Ohio. The plaintiff contends that the agreement contains a proviso
that it is to be determined by the law of New York embodied in a statute
of that state. Held; that the New York statute goes to the' remedy, and as the
law of jurisdiction where relief is sought controls as to all remedial matters
as distinguished from substantive rights, the law of Ohio must be enforced and
judgment was entered accordingly for the defendant. Shafer v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Distributing Corporation, 172 N. E. 689 (Ohio 1930).
The lex fori, or law of the jurisdiction in which relief is sought, controls
as to all matters pertaining to remedial, as distinguished from substantive
rights, and the only uncertainty which may arise concerning this rule must
result from conflicting views as to what matters fall within one or the other
of such classes of rights. 12 C. J. ,483, 484. This is a rule of practically uni-
versal application. The lex foci prevails over the lex rei sitae, the lex contractus,
the lex loci solutionis, and all other laws so far as concerns matters that relate
to the remedy as distinguished from the substantive contract. S R. C. L. 942.
In the instant case the interpretation of the New York rule upon arbitration
agreements must be considered to see whether or not they .regard them as a
part of the remedy or of the substance of the contract. The New 'York view
is that they are a part of the remedy. Meachem v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co.,
211 N. Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 851 (1914). The law that
governs remedies is the law of thel forum. Thus a law such as New York has
in regard to arbitration agreements, has no extra-territorial force. Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 44 S. Ct. 274, 68 L. ed. 582 (1923).
Also. such a statutory remedy will not be enforced in another jurisdiction in
-which such methods of procedure are unknown. Stoddard v. Lum. 159 N. Y.
265. 53 N. E. 1108 (1899); Marshall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 419
(1895); Stewart v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 18 S. Ct. 105,
42 L. ed. 537 (1897); Erickson v. Nesmith, 15 Gray 221 (1860). According to
the Ohio decisions and view unon an arbitration aareement. the nresent aeree-
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ment is equivalent to a common law agreement to arbitrate. As the defendant
in this case had refused to submit to the arbitration board, this distinction
becomes very important, since at common law one had the right to revoke his
agreement to arbitrate at any time prior to the announcement of the award.
State v. Jackson, 36 Ohio St. 281 (1880). "At common law the authority of an
arbitrator could be revoked at any time before award was made. Only an
award in final form could bar the right to revoke the submission. This was
true even though the parties had made an express covenant not to revoke, be-
cause the parties could not-make that irrevocable which was in its nature, re-
vocable." 3 Ohio Jurisprudence 76. The New York court, speaking in Berko-
vitz v. Arbib, 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288, 289 (1921), says "that the com-
mon law limitation upon the enforcement of promises to arbitrate is part of
the law of remedies. The rule to be applied is the rule of the forum. Both in
this court and elsewhere, the law has been so declared. Arbitration is a form of
procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is. not a definition of the
rights or wrongs out of which differences grow." It is readily seen that the
Ohio court *as justified in reversing the, lower court in this case and holding
that the law of Ohio applied where the question was one of remedy and not
of substantive law.
Kenneth J. Konop.
CONTRACTS-DEFALCATON BY EMPLOYEE-AGREEMENT By FRIENDS TO REPAY
ISURER.-J, an employee of a bank, defaulted for a considerable sum 6f
money. The bank had taken out a bond or policy with plaintiff, which bond
stipulated to indemnify the bank against loss caused by the -dishonesty of any
of its employees. After such default J transferred property owned 'by him to
the plaintiff partially to indemnify it for it's loss under said policy or bond
with the bank. A number of J's friends including Thomas, defendant in this
action, entered into an agreement obligating themselves to pay to the plain-
tiff the amounts necessary to reimburse the plaintiff for the loss resulting from
the bond hereinabove referred to. When called upon to pay Thomas refused,
and this action was commenced. Held, contract between the plaintiff and bank
was one of "insurance"; consequently employee was not indebted to the plain-
tiff, and Thomas, who signed the agreement sued on, did so without consider-
ation, the only pretended consideration being the alleged debt of the employee
J to the plaintiff surety company. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Thomas, 129 So. 556 (La. 1930).
All that the plaintiff agreed to do was to pay the insurance loss which it
had suffered and which under its contract of insurance it was bound to pay.
It did nothing that it was not forced to do and it refrained from doing nothing
which it might do. Defendant Thomas, then, received no consideration what-
soever, certainly not to himself and nothing for the benefit of a third person,
to wit, J, for the, payment to the bank by the plaintiff did not deprive the
bank of its right to sue and recovei from J. Louisiana Code, Art. 2315. The
contention of the plaintiff is that the bank's contract with plaintiff was one
of suretyship, and that when plaintiff paid J's shortage to the bank it was
legally subrogated to the bank's claim against J because of articles 2161 and
3052, R. c. c., to the effect that subrogation takes place by right "for the benefit
of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of the
debt, had an interest in discharging it." This is true, the argument proceeds,
whether the surety has been' given with or without the knowledge of the
debtor; and further that the promise to pay the debt of another is sufficient
consideration. New Orleans and Carrollton R. Co. v. Chapman, 8 La. Ann. 97'
(1853). The weight of authority is contrary to this contention. In the United
States Supreme Court the rule of construction governing insurance rontracts is
applied to fidelity guaranty contracts. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S.
133 (1898). In Arkansas a bond insuring the fidelity of an employee issued by
a paid surety is not an ordinary obligation given by a surety but is an indem-
nity bond in the nature of a contract of insurance. Title Guaranty and Surety
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Co. v. Bank o Fulton. 80 Ark. 471' (1900). In Kentucky the contract expressed
in a fidelity bond is but a form of insurance within the rule that ambiguities
must be construed most strongly against the insurer: Champion 'Ice Alanufac-
turing & Cold Storage Co. v. American Bonding and Trust Co., 115 Ky. 863
(1903). In Michigan a bond for indemnity against loss through default of an
employee makes the surety an insurer in all esential particulars .and subject
to the same rules as fire and life insurance companies in regard to a general
agent's authority. Crystal Ice Company Ltd. v. United Surety Co., 15 Mich.
102 (1000). In Missouri these companies are classed as insurers and their con-
tracts interpreted by the rules applicable to oi'dinary insurance contracts. Long
Brothers Grocery Co. v. Utited States Fidelit.y and Guaranty Co., 130 Mo.
App. 421 (1008). In North Carolina a fidelity indemnity bond, given by a
surety company, which in its form and essence resembles an insurance con-
tract. and differs materially from the ordinary forms of bonds, should be
placed in the general class of insurance policies, at least so far as the same
general principles of construction apply: Hank of Tarboro v. Fidelity and De-
posit Co., 128 N. C. 366 (1001). It has been held in Tennessee that employers'
indemnity or fidelity bonds are contracts of insurance, and a fidelity corpora-
tion is an insurance company within the statute of that state imposing a privi-
lege tax on insurance companies. American Surety Co. v. Folk, 124 Tenn. 139
(1911). In Texas the rule of construction against the insurer applies to fidelity
indemnity contracts. Griffin v. Zuber, 113 S. W. 961 (Texas 1008). According
to Wisconsin decisions bonds of this character have all the essential features
of insurance contracts so as to make the rule of construction against the insurer
applicable. United American Fire Insurance Co. v. American Bonding Co. of
Baltimore, 146 Wis. 573 (1Q11).
There are a few cases of a parallel nature to the case discussed. The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court, in 1023, gave a decision in which it was stated that
an agreement by an owner of real estate, to pay a sub-contractor an additional
sum of money to perform his contract with the principal contractor, is founded
upon a valid consideration and will be enforced. Whitehous v. Green, 81 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 386, In Massachusetts the rule that a promise to pay one for doinE
that which he is under prior legal duty to do is not binding for want of con-
sideration does not apply where a party, having entered into a contract with
the adverse party to do certain work, refuses to proceed with it. and the ad-
verse party, to secure himself the actual performance of the work in place of
a right to collect damages from the party, promises to pay an additional 11um;
for in that case there is a new consideration for the promise. Parrot v. Afexican
Central Railway Co.. 207 Mass. 184, 03 N. E. 590 (1911).
Raymond J. Sullivan.
CRIA[I.%.i LAw\-CIRCrTMSTANCES GOVERNcIN RTG11T or PERsoN ATTACKED
TO STAND His GRoUN--DU7TY TO RETRE\T-QUESTON Or FACT FOR .JRY.-The
appellant' Frank, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and appealed from
the judgment. relying upon errors alleged to have occurred during the trial. The
defendant. and his wife, Eva Thompson, were separated. The former became
implicated in a row that occurred at the place kept by his wife, and a report
was made to the peace officer. There was evidence to show that the defendant
believed the deceased to-be the supplier of the information, and that the defend-
ant threatened vengeance therefor. The defendant denied these allegatiots, and
tctified that the deceased had accused him of the'above mentioned threats, and
had. in turn, threatened to kill the defendant; that the deceased had warned
the defendant that the "best man would win" if the latter again attempted to
visit Eva Thoinpson's place. The defendant further testified that at two o'clock
on the morning of December 4th he armed himself with a revolver and went to
his wife's place to beg for something to eat; that he rapped on the door, which,
was opened by one of the inmates, who tried to keep him from entering, and
in so doing pushed the door wide open; that the deceased, entering th room at
that moment, advanced upon him with a hammer upraised, ready to strike; that
th dc'ndart, when the deceased was but two feet away, shot and killed him.
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The defendant pleaded self-defen~e. The court instructed the jury that before
a person could avail himself of this defense the jury must be satisfied that self-
defense was necessary, and that the person attacked aid all he could, consistent
with his own safety, to avoid such action. And further that it is the duty of a
person attacked to retreat as far as the fierceness of the assault will permit.
Held, the instruction given by the court was erroneotus, as it assumed as a matter
of law that the defendant did not have the right to stand his ground, and resist
the assault. Whether, under all the circumstances, he had this right, depends
upon a conclusion of fact to be decided by the jury. Frank v. United States,
42 F. (2d) 623 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
In the instant case there was evidence tending to show that the defendant
had a perfect right to b where he was at the time of the shooting, (the fact
that the door was opened to his knock; that he had previously been admitted;
his relation to the inmates, etc.), and there was evidence tending to show that
he did not have this right (the fact that an attempt was made to eject him as
soon as his presence was known). The defendant was entitled to have the jury
weigh the credibility of his testimony as against the testimony of the other*
witnesses under proper instruction from the court. In Brown v. United States,
256 U. S. 335, 65 L. Ed. 961, (Texas 1921), the Supreme Cburt held that it was
not the duty of a person attacked to retreat before forcibly resisting an assault.
This rule of law was stated on the viewpoint that the failure to retreat was a
circumstance, to be considered with all the others, in determining whether the
defendant went farther than he was justified in doing. Many eminent writers
agree that if a man reasonably believes that he is in imminent dange? of death
or grievous bodily harm from his assailant, he may stand his ground, and that,
if he kills the assailant he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense.
In Beard v. United States, 158, U. S. 550, 39 L. ,Ed. 1086, (Ark. 1895), the
court stated that detached reflection cannot be commanded in the presence of
an uplifted knife, and that therefore it should not be a condition of immunity
that oie in such a position should pause to consider whether a reasonable man
might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather
than kill him. The doctrine invoked by the defendant in the 'main case is
necessarily based on the proposition that the party who stands his ground has
a right to be where he is at that particular time. 30 C. J. 71. If he has no
right to he or remain where he is,, and his assailant has a better right there,
he should retreat to a place where he is entitled to assert his right to stand
his ground. Whether he had the right to be where he was at the time bf the
shooting was clearly a question of fact for the jury. Accord: Bang v. State,
60 Miss. 574 (1882); Long ,v. State, 52 Miss. 35; Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa 433
(1858); Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186
(1872); Slate v. Sherman, 16 R. I. 631 (1889); State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417
(1889). Contra: Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121 (1890); Duncan v. State, 49 Ark.
47 (1887).
Robert E. Duffy.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-EVICTION By LANDLORD-EFFECT OF PARTIAL EVICTION
ON LIABILITY FOR RENT.-In an action to recover unpaid rent, the defense was
partial eviction of the lessee, due to the act of the lessor in making cqrtain repairs
and alterations to the leased premises without the consent of the lessee. It ap-
pears that as a result of the alterations and repairs, access to the basement had
been changed and the corridor thereto and the stairs leading to the second
story had been made somewhat smaller. Held, that even though it is true that
a partial eviction of a tenant from demised premises effects a suspension of the
whole rent, even if the tenant continues in possession of the remainder, the facts
in this case fail to support a partial eviction. Penn v. Radio Distributing Cor-
poration, 148 At. .648. (New .Jersey 1930).
To'form a definition of an "eviction" with any degree of technical accuracy
would be difficult. However to define the term in its general aspects would only
be a matter of choosing one of numerous authorities who are all in accord in
laying down certain elements which go to make up an eviction. "An eviction
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may, in general terms, be said to occur when the tenant is forced to yield pos-
session to one having a title paramount to that of the landlord, or when the.
landlord himself dispossesses the tenant, either by actually taking possession or
by such acts of interference with the latter's enjoyment of the premises that
the tenant is, in the eye of the law, justified in relinquishing possession, and he
does relinquish it." 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 184. Following this
general idea of an eviction, we see that it can only result from acts of the
landlord, or one having a title paramount to that of the landlord. A mere
stranger to the relationship of landlord and tenant cannot act in such a way as
to cause an eviction of the tenant. At most he would be a trespasser. Paterson
v. Bridges, 75 So. 260 (Ala. 1917); Schilling v. Holmes, 23 Cal. 227 (1863);
Hyman v. Jockey Club Co., 48 Pac. 671 (Colo. 1897); Eagle v. Matthews, 98
Kan. 715, 160 Pac. 211 (1916); Sherman v. Williams, 113 Mass. 481 (1873);
Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich. 497, 165 N. W. 716 (1917); City Power Co. v
Fergus Falls Water Co., 55 Minn. 172, 56 N. W. 685 (1893); Lancashire v. Gar.
ford Mfg. Co., 203 S. W. 668 (Mo. 1918) ; Blomberg v. Evans, 194 N. C. 113, 138
S. E. 593 (1927); Holden v. Tidwell, 37 Okla. 553, 133 Pac. 54' (1913); Wein-
stein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn. 593, 202 S. W. 920 (1918) ; Powell v. Merrill, 103
AtI. 25) (Vt. 1918). Furthermore, we see that a landlord is entitled to evict his
tenant either by actually dispossessing him of -the premises or part of them,
or by interfering with the latter's enjoyment of the premises so that he is, in
the eye of the law, justified in relinquishing possession, and he does relinquish
possession. Of these two forms of eviction, the courts find little difficulty with
*the first. It is just a matter of finding that the landlord has entered, that he
has taken possession, and that the tenant has vacated because of the landlord's
possession. The second form, which is called "constructive eviction," gives rise
to more difficulties. The doctrine of constructive eviction is an extension of the
old common law theory of eviction in favor of the tenant. Its introduction
makes it possible for a tenant to set up a defense of eviction not only in cases
involving an actual physical interference of the landlord on the premises, but
also in cases where the possession of the tenant has been disturbed by the act
of the landlord so as to render the premises unfit or unsuitable for occupancy
in whole or in substantial part, for the purpose for which they were leased.
Paterson v. Bridges, 75 So. 260 (Ala. 1917); Veysey v. Morioyama, 184 Cal. 802,
195 Pac. 662 (1921) ; Central Business College Co. v. Rutherford, 47 Colo. 277, 107-
Pac. 279 (1910) ; Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N. E. 805 (1893) ; Skallv
v. Shute, 132 Mass. 367 (1882); Lancashire v. Garford Mfg. Co., 203 S. W. 668
(Mo. 1918); Blomberg v. Evans 194 N. C. 113, 138 S. E. 593 (1927); Holden
v. Tidwell, 37 Okla. 553, 133 Pac. 54 (1913); Weinstein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn.
593, 202 S. W. 920 (1918); Powell v. Merrill, 103 AtI. 259 (Vt. 1918). In addi-
lion to the above rule, the latter group of cases all hold that there has to be
an abandonment of the premises by the tenant before he can claim constructive
eviction. Courts do not attempt to lay down a rule of general application by
which to determine what amounts to a constructive eviction, but they do agree
that the question is one of law, and includes the question whether the acts con-
stitute proof of the intent of the landlord. The intention referred to here is of a
legal nature, and can only be implied from acts on the part of the landlord
which would amount to a permanent and substantial interference with the
tenant's possession. Paterson v. Bridges, 75 So. 260 (Ala. 1917); Fleming v.
King, 100 Ga. 449, 28 S. E. 239 (1897)- Grommes v. St. Paul Trust Co. 147 Ill.
634, 35 N. E. 820 (1893); Skally v. Shute, 132 Mass. 367 (1882); Lancashire v.
Garford Mfg. Co., 203 S. W. 668 (Mo. 1918); Hayward v. Ramge, 33 Neb. 836,
51 N. W. 229 (1892); Blomberg v. Evans, 194 N. C. 113, 138 S. E. 593 (1927"1;
Miller v. Maguire, 18 R. 1. 770, 30 AtI. 966 (1895); Powell v. Merrill, 103 AtI.
259 (Vt. 1918).
Finally, the main case suggests a question upon which there appears some
conflict of authority, namely, does partial eviction of a tenant by the landlord
from leased premises suspend the whole rent even though he remains in posses-
sion of the remainder of the premises demised, or does such an eviction authorize
an abandonment of the premises, and failure to abandon result in liability on
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the tenant's part for a just- portion of the rent? Many courts hold that in case
of partial eviction by the landlord of the tenant, the latter is relieved from the
whole rent so long as he is kept out of possession of such part, and this is
true even though the tenant continues in possession of the remainder. Skaggs v.
P. N. Emerson, 50 Cal. 3 (1875) ; Hayner v. Smith, 63 Ill. 430 (1872) ; Hoagland
v. New York, etc., R. Co., 111 Ind. 443, 12 N. E. 83 (1887) ; Colburn v. Morrill,
117 Mass. 262 (1875); Raver v. Garelick, 221 Mich. 70, 190 N. W. 637 (1922);
Dolph v. Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S. W. 196 (1912); Galleher v. O'Grady,
1CO At. 549 (N. H. 1917) ; Morris v. Kettle, 30 At. 879 (N. J. 1895) ; Peerless
Candy Co. 'v. Habreich, 211 N. Y. S. 676 f 124) ; Frankel v. Steman, 92 Oh. St.
197, 110 N. E. 747 (1915); Seabrook v. Moyer, 88 Pa. 417 (1879); Edminson
v. Lowry, 3 S. D. 77, 52 N. W. 583 (1892); Miller v. Southern Ry. Co. 131
Va. 239, 108 S. E. -838 (1921); Powell v. Merrill, 92 Vt. 125, 103 Atl. 259
(1918); In Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. A. H. Bowman & Co., 291 S. W. 711 (Ky
1927), the court approved of the above rule but failed to apply it in a case
where the landlord remained in possession of a portion of the leased premises
at the time the tenant took possession. In Weinstein v. Barrasso, 202 S. W. 920
(Tenn. 1918), the court recognized the rule but failed to extend it so as to
include a constructive eviction, the reason being that a person cannot claim con-
structive eviction unless he has relinquished possession. This rule is supported
on the ground that an actual eviction of the tenant of the leased premises
presents a tortious aspect involved in the vrongful trespass of the landlord.
Since the agreement in a lease to pay is entire, in consideration of the demise of
the whole estate, the landlord cannot apportion his own wrong as to enforce the
lessee to pay anything for the residue. Ravet v. Garelick, 190 N. W. 637 (Mich.
1922); Morse v. Goddard, 13 Metc. 177, 46 Am. Dec. 728 (1847); Dolph v.
Barry, 165 Mo. App. 659, 148 S. W. 196 (1912). In Galleher v. O'Grady, 100
AtI. 549 (N. H. 1917) the court said, "No man may be encouraged to injure
or disturb his tenant in possession, whom by the policy of feudal law he is
bound to protect and defend." On the other hand, there are cases holding that
a partial eviction of the tenant by the landlord does not entitle the tenant to a
suspension of the entire rent, unless it be shown that the tenant surrendered or
abandoned possession of the whole premises. Failure to show such an abandon-
ment will discharme the rent only pro tanto, to the extent of the value of the
use and occupation of the part of the-premises of which the tenant is dis-
possessed. Anderson v. Winton. 136 Ala. 422, 34 So. 962 (1903); In re Simon
Hotel 223 Fed. 664 fD. C.. N. D. Ala. 1915); Manville v. Gray, 1 Wis. 250, 60
Am. Dec. 379 (1853).
Joseph Yoch.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DEATif OF SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-RIGHTS OF INSURER
-SU RoCA .ox.--This an action of tort brought by the plaintiff, an insurer
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Massachusetts, for the death of
an employee of a subscriber, against a third person whose negligence caused
the death of the employee. The insurer has paid $4,000 to the administratrix of
the deceased and is suing to recover that amount from the defendant. The
insurer bases his right to recover on the'Massachusetts Statute, G. L. c. 152
§ 15, which permits the insurer, who has paid compensation for the employee's
death, to enforce for his own benefit against a third person negligently causing
the employee's death, the rights which would have been available to the repre-
sentatives of the deceased employee. The complaint alleged that the person to
whom the money was paid was the wife of the deceased, but the answer put
this *fact in issue, and the court held, that the administratrix was not the legal
wife of the deceased employee, and that it is a condition precedent to recovery
by the personal representatives for the death of the deceased, "caused by the
negligence of another, to show that the deceased left a widow or next of kin.
The right of the insurer to recover from negligent third persons, having paid
for employee's death, does not rest unon the principle of subrogation. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Huse & Carleton Inc., 172 N. E. 590 (Mass. 1930).
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The administratrix appointed in this case was not the legal wife of' the
deceased employee. She therefore' had no rights under the statutes of Massa-
chusetts to sue a negligent third person who had caused the death of the deceased.
The plaintiff, the insurer in this case, by paying her the deceased's insurance,
was therefore possessed of her rights; but as she had no action against the
defendant, the insurer got nothing by paying her. Massachusetts has repeatedly
held that the insurer stands in no better position than the representatives would
stand if prosecuting the action in their own names for the benefit of those
designated as beneficiaries under' the statute. Turnquist v. Hannon, 219 Mass.
560, 107 N. E. 443 (1914); Bindbeutal v. L. D. Willcutt & Sons Co., 244 Mass.
195, 138 N. E. 239 (1923). It has been held repeatedly that where an action
is brought by the personal representatives to recover damages for the death of
a decedent caused by the negligence of another, it is a condition precedent
to recovery to show that the deceased left a widow or next of kin, to whom
the penalty, when recovered, may be paid. Daly v. New Jersey Steel & Iron Co.,
155 Mass. 5, 29 IN. E. 507 (1891); Bartley v. Boston & Northern Street Railway
Co., 198 Mass. 163, 83 N. E. 1093 (1908); Gorski's Case, 227 Mass. 456, 460,
461, 116 N. E. 811 (1917). The leading case on this subject in Massachusetts is
Turnquist v. Hannon, supra, which held that the insurer of the employer which
has paid to -the widow, compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
has a right of action to enforce for its own benefit the penalty provided by
statutes against the person who has negligently caused the death of the work-
man, and this right does not depend on any theory of reimbursement or sub-
rogation. A claim by the employee against the employer or insurer for compen-
sation may, by express provision of the statute, operate as an assignment to
the employer or insurer of the employee's right of action against the person
causing the injury. Lester v. Otis Elevator Co., 169 App. Div. 613, 155 N. Y. S.
524 (1915); Pawlak v. Hayes, 162 Wis. 503, 156 N. W. 464 (1916); McGarvey
v. Independent Oil Co., 156 Wis. 580, 146 N. W. 895 (1914). There is a conflict
of authority on the amount of damage the insurer can recover in a suit against
the negligent third person. It has been held that the insurer can only recover
to the amount of the compensation paid. U. S. Fidelity Co. v. New York R. Co.,
156 N. Y. S. 615 (1915). But in McGarvey v. Indep'endent OilCo., supra, it
was held tfiat the insurer succeeds to the entire right of action as the real party
in interest. Also, by statute in California, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massa-
chusetts and others, it is provided that 'any surplus collected by the insurer in
excess of the indemnification, shall be deposited in the state insurance fund.
Kenneth J. Konop.
MORTGAGES-REN;FNAL OF NOTE NOT DEEMED PAMENT.-Appeal from a
judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage. The defendant, a corporation, executed
and delivered its promissory note for the sum of $55,000, together' with a
mortgage upon certain real property, to the Barmer Consolidated Mines, Inc.
The mortgage provided that upon default in any installment of the note the
entire sum should become due at the option of the holder. The first installment
became due, but no part of its principle or intqrest was paid. Later the note
and mortgage were assigned to the plaintiff who sued for foreclosure of the
mortgage. Defendant contended that the execution and delivery of another note
by them constituted payment in full of the note which is secured by the mortgage.
Plaintiff contended that the second note was accepted as a mere extension of
time of payment of the first installment of the original note. Held, a note ex-
ecuted as a renewal of the original note secured by a mortgage is not deemed
in payment thereof. Archibald v. Western Mines Consolidated, Inc., 291 Pac.
440 (Cal. 1930).
A mortgage secures a debt or obligation and not the evidence of it,, and
neither the renewal or substitution of the evidence of the debt will impair
the lien of the mortgage. 2 JONES ON MORTGAGES, § 924; Cullen v. Brank Bank
at Mobile, 23 Ala. 797 (1853); Dana v. Binnery, 7 Vt. 493 (1835); Brown v.
"Dunckel, 46 Mich. 29 (1881); Gleason v. Wright, 56 Miss. 247 (1876); Hill v.
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Beebe, 13 N. Y. 556 (1856). Nothing but payment or a release will have the
effect of discharging a mortgage. Parkhurst v. Cummings, 56 MAle. 155 (1868);
Wlliitticre v. Fuller, 5 Minn. 508 (1861). In Boles v. Chauncey, 8 Conn. 3o2
(1831), the court said, "As between the mortgagor and the mortgagee there can
be no pretense for saying that the substitution of one note for another is a
satisfaction of the con'dition of the mortgage." And again the rule is stated' that,
the renewal of a note secured by a mortgage is not payment thereof, nor is
the substitution of a new note for the old one, a payment; and in the absence of
some agreement or plain' manifestation of a contrary intention, the security
;emains intact. Oliphint v. Eckerty, 36 Ark. 69 (1880); Bolles v. Chauncey, 8
Conn. 386 (1S31); Watkins v. Hilt, 8 Pick. 522 (1820). A mortgage is security
for the payment of a debt. So the general rule which would logically follow
would be, that, whatever extinguishes the latter,. at the same time puts an end
to the former: but nothing but the actual payment of the debt or an express
release will operate as a discharge of the mortgage. In Ames v. New Orleans 3f.
& T. R. Co., Fed. Case No. 329 (1876) the court found that' the lien of the
mortgagor is not affected by the substitution of new notes or bonds for thote
originally secured, or by the giving of a new mortgage expressly reserving the
rights of the original mortgagee. In Burdett v. Clay, 8 B. Mon. 287 (1843),
the taking of a second mortgage was no waiver of a first one made for the
same debt. Neither is the taking of personal security for the debt a waiver of
the mortgage. In Blnme v. Weston, 127 S. E. 561 (S. C. 1925), it was held
that change in the mode or time of payment does not operate to discharge the
mortgage. In an Indiana case, Pivot City Realty Co. v. State Savings and Trust
Co., 162 N. E. 27 (1928), an execution or renewal note was held not to dis-
charge indebtedness, for which the original note was given, or to release the
security. Even assuming that the new note was executed as a renewal of the
original note, it would not be deemed to have been in payment thereof, as it
would still be mere evidence of the original indebtedness for which the mortgage
was given as security. In Sloan v. Rice, 41 Iova 465 (1875), it was held that
if a new note is gii'en, the burden is upon the mortgagee to show an agreement
that the mortgage should be released upon the execution of the new note. Coles
v. Withers, 33 Gratt 186 (1880). From these cases it can be readily seen that
there can be no actual changes in the rights or remedies of the mortgagee, unless
there is an actual agreement or intention of the parties that the mortgage shall
be discharged.
Carl Frankovitch.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SPECIAL AssEssMENTS-NATURE OF--HOW EN-
FORCE--PERSONAL LIABILITY-PENALTY FOR NOkPAYENT.-The private Acts
of 1927, c. 768, which was an amendment of Acts 1909, c. 401, authorized
the city of South Fulton to improve it streets "and to cause the entire cost or
expense . . . to be assessed against the property abutting or adjacent to said
street, avenue, alley or any other public place so improved." The act, however,
failed to prescribe any method or procedure for the collection of the assessment,
but provided for a penalty of ten per cent on each assessment not paid when
due. By authority of this ordinance two streets were 'paved with gravel and
concrete. The present suit has arisen out of the original bill to enforce the
apportionment of the assessment against the abutting property owners. Held,
that the assessments should be declared liens on the respective parcels of land,
and that the same be sold in satisfaction of the claims'of the city, and that the
penalty be declared void. City of South Fulton v. Parker, 28 S. W. (2d) 639
(Tenn. 1930).
As to the nature of a special assessment there is little dispute. In fact, it is
generally recognized as a particular kind of tax. As the c6urt says in the case of
Arnold v. Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 195, 212, 90 S. W. 469, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837
(1905), "assessments are in the nature of taxation and the power to impose them
is sustained as an exercise of the taxing power of the government." In Roesch
v. State, 62 Fla. 263, 270, 56 So. 562, 564, 565, (1911), an assessment is said
to be a tax specially levied against the property benefitted. Other cases in
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accord with this proposition are: Gadd v. McGuire, 69 Cal. App. 347, 231 Pac.
754 (1924); Fairmont Wall Plaster Co. v. Nuzum, 85 W. Va. 667, 102 S. E.
494 (1920) ; Madsen v. Bonneville lrr. Dist. 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781 (1925);
Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 329 (1868). The fact that the ordinance failed to
prescribe a method of collection does not preclude the idea that no recovery
could be had against the abutting property owners for the assessments. In
McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, vol. 5, § 2133, it is said, "If no specific
mode of enforcing assessments has been authorized by statute or charter, an
action will lie; but if the method has been provided, ordinarily, it is exclusive."
in Cooley on Taxation (4th ed.) vol. 3, § 1331, it is said, "The implication of
an intent to give a remedy by suit is so strong as to be conclusive, where the
statute provides for a tax, but is silent as to the method of collection." More-
over, it is not reasonable to suppose that the legislature would intend to do a
vain thing, which would be the case of conferring a right and at the same time
denying a remedy for its enforcement. Having decided that there is a liability
on the abutting property owners the questionis, what is the nature of this
liability? The instant case holds the liability to be a personal one, with the
limitation tfhat only the property against which the assessment is made is liable
for its payment. This is in accord with the majority rule that special assessments,
being a charge upon particular property, may be collected by enforcing a lien
upon property. Meyer v. City of Covington, 103 Ky. 546, 45 S. W. 769 (1898);
City of Omaha v. State, 69 Neb. 29, 94 N. W. 979 (1903); Town of Macon v-
Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 38 Am. Rep. 451; City of Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 32,
14 S. E. 251 (1892): Higgins v. Ausmuss, 77 Mo. 351 (1883), Contra: Bennett
v. City of Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383 (1858) ; Hazzard v. Heacock, 39 Ind. 172 (1872) ;
Bonsall v. Mayor, etc., of the Town of Lebanon, 19 Ohio 419 (1850). A municipal
corporation depends for the validity of its acts on the express provisions of its
charter. As there is no provision allowing for the assessment of a penalty for
nonpayment the penalty cannot be sustained.
Joseph Wetli.
NEGLIGENCE-STOREKEEPER'S LIABILITY TO CusTomER-DAMAGEs. Appeal
from a judgment against the appellant, defendant below, for damages resulting
from injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the defendant's store. The defendant
conducted a "five-and-ten-cent" store. On a certain afternoon, the plaintiff
entered the store and made a purchase, and, on leaving, slipped and fell upon
the floor, thereby breaking her arm. She testified that at the time of the accident
she noticed an oval shaped spot on the floor at about the point where she
fell; that the spot was darker than the floor; that it was slightly raised above
the floor; and that she believed that her h'eel went into the spot and caused
her to slip. Witnesses testified that, upon an immediate examination of the floor
after the accident, no substance appeared on the floor that would cause the
plaintiff to slip. One witness testified that he was employed by the defendant
as a receiving clerk; that he immediately went to the point where the plaintiff
fell, and upon close examination of the floor found it to be perfectly dry. The
manager and assistant manager of the store and two clerks testified that they
examined the floor within a few minutes after the accident and that they found
ihe floor to be clean; that there was no trash, soap, or grease of any kind on
the floor. It is charged in the declaration that the defendant was negligent in
that "it allowed and permitted some greasy, slimy, oily, or other foreign sub-
stance to be and remain upon the said floor, and did fail to remove and clear
said floor of said substance thereon." Held, that the customer slipping on the
floor of a store has the burden of proving the store owner's negligence. F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Williams, 41 Fed. (2d), 970 (C. A., Dist. of Col. 1930).
The burden of proving defendant's negligence is upon the plaintiff. The mere
happening of the accident does not shift to the defendant the burden of estab-
lishing that the accident did not occur through its negligence, nor does it create
a presumption of negligence. On the contrary, the legal presumption is that
reasonable care was exercised by the defendant. On the whole, the plaintiff
must show that the defective condition of the floor, as the case will be, had
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either been in fact brought to the previous notice of the defendant, or that
the defect had existed for such space of time before the occurence as would
have afforded the company sufficient opportunity to make proper inspection of
its floors to ascertain their condition as to safety, and to repair their defects,
if any. In the absence 'of proof of either, the legal presumption is that the
defendant had used reasonable care. Evidence in the case substantiated the
fact that the flobr had been swept only a few minutes prior to the accident.
The plaintiff cannot sustain her case by merely showing that a spot was there.
And as the plaintiff made no attempt to show how or by whom the spot was
created, or how long it had existed, her case must fail. It is by no means
sufficient for her to show that the oil was there; she must go further and show
its presence under circumstances sufficient to charge the defendants with re-
sponsibility therefor. The proprietor of a store is merely under the duty of
exercising reasonable care to keep his store in a safe condition, and like any
other person who expressly or impliedly invites others upon his premises, is not
an insurer of their safety while in the store; but he owes to them merely the
duty of exercising reasonable care to keep the store in a safe condition for their
proper use. Kaufman Dept. Stores, Inc., v. Cranston, 258 Fed. 917, 918 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1919). Consequently, it is not the law to make a store proprietor an in-
surer for the safety of its customers while in its store.
Harold Tuberty.
SALES-SUBSTITUTION OF GOODS-INORANCE OF THE BUYER.-The defendant
purchased lumber for a building, specifying fir. Plaintiff delivered hemlock in-
stead-of the lumber specified. After the building was finished defects appeared
which were caused by the substitution of the hemlock lumber for the fir. The
defendant had no knowledge of the substitution until after the building had
been completed. The plaintiff filed a lien for the balance due on the purchase
price of the lumber._ Defendant set forth a counter-claim for damages stating
that the hemlock lumber was not fit for the purpose for which it was furnished.
Held, as the building was completed before the defendfant learned of the sub-
stitution he must retain 'the hemlock and is entitled to damages resulting from
its inferior quality. Midland Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bean, 231 N. W. 206 (Minn.
1930).
The case of Danville Lumber and Mjg. Co. v. Gallivan Bldg. Co., 97 S. E.
718 (N. C. 1919), is in point. In this case the court held that unless the defend-
ant building contractor knew of the defects in the sashes, his retention thereof
would not constitute a waiver of defects; waiver being largely a matter of in-
tent and dependent on knowledge. The cases on this point hold that the party
cannot waive this defect as it could not be ascertained under the ordinary in-
spection and is not apparent until the goods are applied to some use which pre-
cludes a return thereof. A majority of the states are in accord with the princi-
ple case. McCaa v. Elam Drug Co., 114 Ala. 74, 21 So, 479, 62 Am. St. Rep. 88
(1897) ; Wallace v. Knoxville Woolen Mills, 117 Ky. 450, 78 S. W. 192, 25 Ky.
L. Rep. 1445 (1904); Buick Motor Co. v. Reid Mfg. Co., 150 Mich. 118, 113
N. W. 591 (1907); Carleton v. Lombard, 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422 (1896):
Zabriskie v. Central Vermont Rr. Co., 131 N. Y. 72, 29 N. E. 1006 (1892);
Bagley v. Cleveland Rolling-Mills Co., 21 Fed. 159 (1884); Shreveport Mill and
Elevator Co. v. Stochr,. 139 La. 719, 71 So. 961 (1916).
Alvin G. Kolski.
TiHEATERS AND SHOWS-STATUTOlY OFFENSES BY PROPRIETORS.-The defendant
was operating a public restaurant in a seventeen room building. In one of the
rooms a new hard-wood floor had been installed, particularly suitable for dancing,
and especially used therefor. In this room there was a piano and a phonograph,
the latter being operated by means of a nickel placed in a slot. Although the de-
fendant at times would deposit a coin therein.to obtain music, it was generally
operated by the patrons of the restaurant. The defendant had a restaurant
license. Two witnesses testified that they, with four other couples danced after
